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Abstract:
The negotiation theory that François de Callières (1645-1716) built promotes peace politics in the
international arena. First, we develop the political rationality that prevailed in the 17
th Century,
essentially under the realm of Louis XIV. European power politics is dominated by the recurrence of
wars. In that context, negotiation is crucial, but essentially conceived as a means at the disposal of a
bellicose agenda. Afterwards, Callières is shown to propose a more ambitious alternative vision for
future negotiators, and suggests they could be the key-players in peace politics, as long as the use of
powerful persuasion serves legitimate ends. Then European nations, with the interdependence of their
interests can form one republic aspiring to common prosperity.
Keywords:
Negotiation Theory – Diplomatic Negotiation – Callières – Louis  XIV – War politics – Peace  politics
– Persuasion – Rhetoric – Interdependence of interests  – Europe
Résumé :
 La théorie de la négociation élaborée par François de Callières (1645-1716) favorise une politique de
la paix sur la scène internationale. D’abord, nous développons la rationalité politique européenne qui
prévaut au 17
e siècle ; elle est dominée par la récurrence des guerres, sous le règne de Louis XIV.
Dans ce contexte, la négociation est cruciale, mais essentiellement conçue comme un moyen à la
disposition d’un agenda belliqueux. Ensuite, nous montrons comment  Callières propose une vision
alternative plus ambitieuse pour les négociateurs futurs et suggère qu’ils peuvent être des acteurs-clés
d’une politique de paix, tant que l’usage de leurs moyens puissants de persuasion servent des fins
légitimes. Alors, les nations européennes, à travers l’interdépendance de leurs intérêts, peuvent former
une république aspirant à une prospérité commune.
Mots-clés :
Théorie de la négociation – Négociation diplomatique – Callières – Louis  XIV – Politique de guerre –
Politique de paix – Persuasion – Rhétorique – Interdépendance  des intérêts – EuropeCallières: A Rhetorical Foundation of International Negotiations
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“Such is, judicious Callières,
The Great Work of Peace,
Which covers your name in Light,
And forever makes it famous,
France admires your stature
Among its long cries of elation,
Of all peoples rejoicing.”
Charles Perrault,
Ode to François de Callières on Peace Negotiation, 1698.
If Charles Perrault, who is better known for his fairy tales, congratulated François de Callières,
negotiator, for his contribution to the Peace Treaty of Ryswick (1697), we may as much pay tribute
today to the negotiation theoretician, for his pioneering work on peace theory,  On the Manner of
Negotiating with Princes  (1716).  The quality of this text, especially when combined with another less
known of his books The Knowledge of the World, and the Attainments Useful in the Conduct of Life
(1717), lies not simply in its elegant style, but in its acuity and modernity of concepts and precepts,
which include recommendations for negotiation preparation, process, and analysis, but which also
proposes a rhetorical foundation for peace politics that will be examined in this paper.
Callières, who lives through decades of recurring European wars and knows very well the
many diplomatic attempts to put an end to them, develops an anthropological philosophy where the
“honnête homme” and the ruler must strive to preserve peace through persuasion, as well as a theory
of the foundations of politics as the “art of handling hearts”, where negotiation is central, not simply as
a set of skills, but as a way of life in society, both internally and on the European scene. Very
pragmatically and in a very modern fashion,  Callières calls for the need for national sovereign
authorities to build a network of skillful and legitimate negotiators, whose end is to make nations
prosper together.
The first part of this article focuses on the political rationality that prevailed in the 17
th
Century, essentially under the realm of Louis XIV. In this context of European power politics, that is
dominated by the recurrence of wars, and that Callières was familiar with as a diplomat himself,
negotiation is crucial, but essentially conceived as a means at the disposal of a bellicose agenda. In the
second part, we show how  Callières proposes a more ambitious alternative vision for future
negotiators, and suggests they could be the key-players in peace politics, as long as the use of
powerful persuasion serves legitimate ends of European nations. Then the latter, with the
interdependence of their interests, can form one republic aspiring to common prosperity.Callières: A Rhetorical Foundation of International Negotiations
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From War Politics to People’s Exhaustion
War is a never ending story during the 17
th Century, the “Great Century” as the French call it.
In this context, negotiation is the servant of war; and diplomats often simply further a bellicose
politics. Alliances and peace treaties are made and unmade according to the wishes of powers,
however big or small. The European equilibrium of states is fragile, but knows a series of successes.
Ups of peace and downs of war alternate every few years. All throughout the later half of the century,
diplomacy, as well as many texts that account for its action, plays a central role, as a possible
alternative to war, and it will frame Callières’ understanding of politics and his own theory.
Callières’s 17
th Century Sources on Negotiations
Sources not lacking, Callières reads the rich diplomatic correspondence, as he indicates in
Chapter 5 of his Manner of Negotiating (1716) and as we illustrate in our bibliography of primary
sources at the end of this text.  From his own acknowledgement and from the inventory of his library,
he learns about best practices from Cardinal  d’Ossat, President Jeannin and Marshal  Bassompierre,
who at the end of the 16
th Century and later, served as ambassadors kings François I, Henri IV and
Louis XIII of France.
1  This proclivity of negotiators who detail their activities in letter exchanges is
not the end of the story.  Books account for peace negotiations as a way of preventing, or finishing
wars, but also as a way for ambassadors to justify their actions in court or with the public, and
sometimes for countries to account for their own foreign policy. For example, the difference of
opinions that opposed Claude d’Avaux and Abel Servien, emissaries of Richelieu and Mazarin, to the
preliminary negotiations of the Treaties of Westphalia led to a book.
2  Prime minister Richelieu, who
dies in 1644, recognizes, in his Political Testament, how negotiations are central in public action:
“States receive so many advantages from continual negotiations, when they are
conducted with prudence, that it is not possible to know it, if one does not know it
from experience. […]  I dare to say that negotiating at all times, openly or secretly, in
all places, though one does not receive a present fruit and though the fruit one expects
for the future is not apparent, is a very important asset for the good of the states.”
3
The cardinal’s lessons will be well understood and practiced by professional negotiators.
Perpetual negotiations at all times and places must be led, even independently of a specific object and
of an immediate return, precisely because they may one day serve a precise outcome. The key
recommendation: it is often too late to start negotiating when we have something to negotiate. What I
                                                                
1 The various works made reference to are included at the end of the bibliography:  Ossat (1624) and President
Jeannin (1656), Bassompierre (1668). Callière’s library is printed in Callières, Practice of Diplomacy (1983), pp.
219-224.
2 Claude d’Avaux and Servien (1650).
3 Richelieu (1688, 1947), pp. 347, quoted in Callières (1716, 2002), p. 70.Callières: A Rhetorical Foundation of International Negotiations
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have called the “negotiation fallow”, i.e. resting in the other’s company, enjoying the pleasure of the
conversation, not trying to achieve any outcome right now, helps build a relationship, which is very
often a preliminary condition to later business talks. It is as much a matter of politeness and good
manners as it is a way of knowing the other better. In France, still today, you would not talk about
business before a meal is nearly ending; you would do it between “la poire et le fromage” (“the pear
and the cheese”).
 Later in the second half of the century, a new generation of negotiators, as skilled as their
predecessors in the art of socializing, emerges with  Hugues de Lionne, Estrades and another count
d’Avaux. They help Louis XIV in building offensive or defensive alliances and follow his propensity
to often favor warlike rather than peaceful resolution.
4 Some of their correspondences were not printed
until the next century. However, we may suppose that the content of their  continual negotiations
occupied conversations at the court and among diplomats, including Callières.  As secretary of the
king’s cabinet from 1701 to 1708 and predisposed to writing,
5  Callières had no difficulty to get
acquainted with a number of diplomatic texts and write some himself.
This ensemble of documents that Callières consulted and the illustrations he extracts from
them and from his own experience as a diplomat constitute enough empirical matter for his synthesis
on peace politics and negotiation, particularly if we add the contributions of  Vittorio  Siri and of
Abraham de Wicquefort, whose two volumes on the ambassador’s functions Callières also read.
6  All
these works enlarge the already impressive body of literature and complete it with non-French
perspectives on negotiation and together form a corpus in search of structuring.
The events which agitated Europe at the beginning of the 18
th Century did not change
Callières’s profound convictions preferring negotiation to war.
 7  The virtue of his analyses arises not
                                                                
4 Grandmont and Lionne (1659), Estrades (1710) and Jean-Antoine d’Avaux (1752).
5 Important position that required a high-level of fidelity, the secretary of the king was able to “imitate so closely
the king’s handwriting that sometimes it was difficult to tell the difference.” Saint-Simon, Mémoires I (1990), p.
53.
6 Siri (1677) and Wicquefort (1673, 1676). Ambassador Wicquefort could not be openly cited, because of his
expulsion from France by Prime Minister Mazarin, after he had revealed the affairs of the king with the niece of
the Prime Minister in his diplomatic accounts.
7 Probably preoccupied with confidentiality and prudence, in his final text, Callières chooses not to comment on
events after Ryswick (1697), where he was the key negotiator. As Keens-Soper and Schweizer note in their 1983
English edition of Callières’ book, everything leads to believe that Callières’s work could have been published
earlier, not simply because of the epistle found in the archives originally dedicated to Louis XIV, but also
because of its content.  If there is a short reference made to the Treaty of Ryswick, for example, it evokes in no
way the Spanish Succession, which was a French preoccupation on a military and diplomatic levels from 1701
onward. Callières, however, did not abstain in his memoranda to the Secretary of State, Torcy, from noting that
he was in favor of a negotiated agreement for an equitable partition of the Spanish heritage and an appeasement
of the Dutch.  The fact that Callières did not mention this in his work suggests a disagreement with France’s
foreign policy of hegemony through wars of the time. See “Introduction,” by H.M.A. Keens-Soper and Karl W.Callières: A Rhetorical Foundation of International Negotiations
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simply out of a particular situation, but reveals a general set of ideas.  The integration of more recent
events, such as those related to the war of the Spanish Succession after 1701, would have added
nothing to the persuasive value of his conclusions.  Moreover, had it been included, though it would
have assured a better, more immediate, diffusion, it could also have nurtured a polemic, which
Callières probably wanted to avoid at the end of his life and which would not have helped him in his
enterprise of spreading the word about the high value of diplomacy, and peace equilibrium.
At his epoch,  Callières is without rival to build the needed synthesis.
8  He establishes the
foundation of a negotiation  ?????, transcending time and place. He goes beyond diplomatic
documents, which, attached to a particular negotiation within a specific context, lacks distance in
relation to the events and does not succeed at inferring recurrent phenomena which help build a
conceptual framework for alternative politics.
9  Callières is impregnated in the negotiation data of his
time, but he shows himself to be skilled enough in getting to the heart of the matter.  He founds his
approach on common sense, analyzes, criticizes, and makes evident good practices that can keep rulers
and their diplomats away from negotiation failures and the terrible outrage of wars.  As we will see,
more than just thinking about the use of negotiation in a context of war, he proposes to us, in a certain
way, an essay on peaceful methods of conflict prevention and resolution, a first rational approach to
the negotiation process and skills.  He is, in that sense, the original theoretician of negotiation, and
initiates us to the profession and art of diplomacy.
The 17
th Century of Wars and Related Negotiations
When looking at European history of the 17
th Century, politics looks as a succession of battles
and negotiation tables. Just to give a few examples. The Thirty-Year War (1618-1648) was the first
truly European war, when we consider all the continental countries fighting on German soil; it led to
one of the longest  peace talks in European history, with 179 diplomats representing 194
sovereignties,
10 in Munster and Osnabrück, where a hundred diplomats worked from 1643 until 1648.
This was “a truly European Congress. Nearly all the powers were represented, except the czar of
                                                                                                                                                                                                          
Schweizer, to the only scientific English edition of Callières’s book under the title: The Practice of Diplomacy
(1983), p. 15.
8 In order to account for the success of Callières’ On the Art of Negotiating with Princes, suffice it to say that it
had been translated shortly after its first publication in 1716 in German, English, and Italian, as well as in
Russian after its republications in French in 1750, 1757 and 1766. Though it was not published in French since
1766 until our 2002 edition, Callières’s work was published four times in English in the 20
th Century and also
published in Polish and in Japanese.
9 Wicquefort attempted to establish such a synthesis but he defeats himself in his analysis of details and in his
collection of facts, anecdotes and customs. In his text, Callières falls only once into Wicquefort’s pitfalls, when
he addresses questions of title and protocol in Chapters 6, 7 and 10.  These are the only chapters in his work in
which the text seems dated, particularly concerning Callières’s distinctions of rank.  For their particularity, these
passages present, nevertheless, an interest for a researcher or a practitioner who is dealing with highly codified
hierarchical cultures.
10 Bély (1992), p. 348  et p. 157.Callières: A Rhetorical Foundation of International Negotiations
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Moscovia, the sultan and the king of England.”
11 One of the ambassadors summarized the alternation
of peace discussions and war campaigns: “during the winter, we negotiate; during the summer, we
fight”
12. Brienne, the French Secretary of State writes to his plenipotentiaries:
“It is essential not to stop the war, because it is the only means at our disposal to urge
them to progress on the road to peace… Experience has shown that the progress of
arms was the most probing reason that we can give you to convince the enemy to
consent to equitable conditions towards peace.”
13
The Peace Treaties of Westphalia will be finally concluded
14; and will be remembered in Germany for
years.
15 The peace was not total however; two countries remained at war, France and Spain, fighting
for dominance in Europe from 1648 on. It is only in 1659 that the four-month negotiations between
prime minister Luis de Haro, for Spain, and his French counterpart, Cardinal  Mazarin, led to the
signature of the Treaty of Pyrénées (1659) on the island of Pheasants what is still called today the
“island of the conference”, on the Bidassoa river bordering the two nations.
16 For the first time since
the 14
th Century, thanks to Mazarin, France could claim peace and security along its borders.
17
  From infancy to adult life, Louis XIV had followed his apprenticeship of politics as war
during the first 21 years of his life; he had only known France involved in wars until 1659.  When
Mazarin dies in 1661, Louis XIV starts ruling alone without prime minister, as an absolute king (The
State, it is me); he will also make ongoing wars and related negotiations a centerpiece of his politics.
The Devolution War (1667-1668), was decided by Louis XIV who claimed the Spanish Netherlands as
his heritage, on behalf of his wife Marie-Thérèse, daughter of the  King of Spain. After a very
successful military campaign and the split of his own cabinet between the peace partisans – Colbert,
Lionne and Le Tellier – and the war partisans –  Condé,  Louvois and  Turenne –, Louis XIV finally
decided to put an end to this war in the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. The Holland War (1672-1678) was
even more the king’s decision, and hard for him to justify, except by his politics of grandeur and
expansion.
18 Several offers by the Ducth de Groot were refused by Louis XIV. Humiliating counter-
offers were sent, and the war dragged on at the expense of French finances and morale. England, and
later Rome and  Venise proposed their mediation until the nine Treaties of Nijmegen (1679) finally
concluded three years of peace talks.
19 This is the time where France is without any doubt
preponderant in Europe, and Louis XIV becomes Louis le Grand, though he has now alienated most of
European nations against him, including many small German states that Richelieu and  Mazarin had
                                                                
11 Bély & alii (1991), p. 177.
12 Bély (1992), p. 156.
13 Quoted by Craxton in Bély (2000), p. 271.
14 Bély (2000).
15 Gantet (2001).
16 Mazarin (1690), Callières (2002), p. 201.
17 Lossky (1994), p. 60.
18 Sonnino (1988).
19 Estrades (1710, 1743)Callières: A Rhetorical Foundation of International Negotiations
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made zealous partisans of France as warrantor against the Emperor. A policy of “reunions”, where
some territories were claimed by negotiation and threats of war, was conducted and led to the War of
the Reunions (1683-84), which was itself concluded by the Ratisbonne Truce. The  Nine-Year War
(1688-1697), where France and Holland are again at war, ends after three years of negotiations, where
Callières is strongly involved, secretly and then openly as a plenipotentiary ambassador at a forty-
diplomats conference  held in Ryswick, until Marshall Boufflers for France and Bentinck for England
took over and signed the peace treaty, for which Perrault praised Callières’ contribution.
20 In order to
understand better this litany of wars, mixed with negotiations, Lynn summarizes it as “war-as-process”
with five characteristics: “the indecisive character of battle and siege, the slow tempo of operations,
the strong resolve to make war feed war, the powerful influence of attrition, and the considerable
emphasis given to ongoing negotiations.”
21
Under Richelieu and his pupil Mazarin, balance of powers was the apparent objective of war
policy and alliances aim at counterbalancing the claim to universal monarchy of the Spanish and
Austrian Habsbourg. Later, in 1659, when this goal was definitively achieved, the power had shifted
towards France in Europe. As the master of a more-than-ever-before centralized nation, Louis the
Great waged insatiable military campaigns, supposedly to insure France’s “pré carré” (square field),
i.e. defensible natural borders (the North Sea, the Rhine, the Alps, the Mediterranean Sea, the
Pyrénées), but in fact war was inherent in the king’s search for gloire; it defined his own job per se as
king, in the line of the nobility who would consider their very existence and value dependable on their
military grandeur.
22 This bellicose policy was often perceived with growing impatience by the other
European countries as threatening, illegitimate and arrogant. And when in 1715 Louis XIV’s realm
was over, France, in social and economic exhaustion, had lost much of its high ground, and was to be
progressively replaced in legitimacy and strength by England as the dominant power.
23
The Meaning of Negotiations in War Contexts
During this whole period of French political increasing power, it is important to recognize that
negotiation was intense, but very often subservient to a war policy. It served to put an end to a war, as
all the above-mentioned treaties recalled. It had often other goals relating to wars. It helped get allies
for war itself or at least neutrals. Some examples can describe this use of negotiation. For reason of
state, Cardinal Richelieu did not hesitate to initiate talks with a protestant king, Gustavus Adolphus of
Sweden, and to pay him subsidies for fighting the catholic Habsbourg in 1630.
24  By this objective
                                                                
20 Childs (1991). See Didier (1697), Mascarenhas (1697).
21 Lynn (1999), p. 2.
22 Lynn (1999), p. 28-32.
23 Mably (2001).
24 Callières (2002), pp. 71-72.Callières: A Rhetorical Foundation of International Negotiations
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alliance which undermined the emperor’s power in Germany, Sweden could notably be considered as
the agent of France in the Thirty-Year War, without the need for France to be directly involved, at
least until 1635. Later in 1667, the French convinced the Portuguese to continue their war against
Spain, with their financial support. Allies could be convinced through subsidies, so that wars could be
led by others, somewhere else, to one’s own profit. Callières wraps it up very well:
“A skillful negotiator can make profit of diverse moods and changes that occur in the
country where he is, not only to counter the projects that are contrary to his prince’s
interests, but also to help other projects that are advantageous to him. By his
ingenuity, he provokes changes that are favorable to the business he is in charge of.”
25
Another example of negotiation contribution to French war activity is provided by Callières. In 1671,
the Dutch ambassador in England, Jan Boreel was unable to appreciate the growing influence of the
French ambassador Colbert de Croissy, who succeeded in getting Charles II of England involved in
the offensive Treaty of Dover, where England would support France in its war against Holland.
Duplicity of the raison d’état had no limits. Jan de Witt, the great pensionnaire of Holland, was not on
guard at all, since Lionne, the French Secretary of State, had sent as ambassador to Holland in 1669,
Arnauld de Pomponne, whose mission was supposedly to negotiate with the Dutch, but in fact was to
keep them asleep, i.e. unaware of the war preparation against them. The next year, Grémonville was
sent to the emperor to package a secret agreement of neutrality, as long as the war stayed outside the
empire limits. A ten-year alliance agreement was also signed with the elector of Brandebourg. This
whole sophisticated system  of negotiation, that took three years in this case, was part of the
“préparatifs diplomatiques” (diplomatic preparation) for war.
  26 Negotiations also served to create
internal troubles in the enemy’s territory; for example Louis XIV contributed to the Hungarian
nationalist cause, by helping Thököly and the revolt of the  “malcontents” until 1683 and later Rakoczi
at the beginning of the 18
th Century in their fight against the emperor.
27
Though Callières is aware of the frequent use of negotiations in the context of war, and of its
high efficiency there, if we look closely at his writings, there is also a double awareness that we will
further examine in this text: first, war is not the most rational policy, and second, negotiations for the
only purpose of helping war may not be the best use of this tool either. Callières will clearly show the
limits of wars and a possible extension of negotiation use. To quickly understand the latter point, in his
own practice as a negotiator, when he drafted the clauses of the  Ryswick Treaty, Callières paid as
much attention to the provisions that would help trade and exchanges between France and the United
Provinces. Peace is not simply the silence of arms, it must be the signal for a renewal of business
activity to foster an interdependence of interests. Peace by economics if you wish.
                                                                
25 Callières (2002), p. 69.
26 Petitfils (1995), pp. 367-8.
27 Bély & alii (1992), p. 63.Callières: A Rhetorical Foundation of International Negotiations
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Louis XIV and the Limits of War in Political Rationality
At the end of his reign, Louis XIV left France in a critical state of exhaustion after decades of
military campaigns.  The Treaties of Utrecht (1713) and  Rastadt (1714) are the ultimate signs of
failure of a political expansion that was based on the military.  The theories of the Sun King, alpha and
omega of royal egocentric thought and action, internally and externally, based on force, had vanished.
If at the beginning of his reign, through Mazarin, Louis XIV could still justify his use of force inside
France to counter the fronde, a revolt by the nobility, and outside in Europe to fight Austrian and
Spanish domination, the situation changed rapidly as Louis XIV and France came to prevail all over
Europe through very long and costly wars. He had lost most of his allies, including many of these
small German states that Mazarin had established in a pro-French Rhine League. France stood alone
against all. Most European states were exceeded by the sun king’s never-ending hunger for more
domination. Louis XIV seemed  uncapable of changing politics. There was never enough
demonstration of his might. If Callières takes Alexander or Caesar as an example, when denouncing
political conquests, it is relatively easy to apply his conclusions to Louis XIV:
“It is a major error of the vulgar to praise conquerors without making the distinction
between conquests that are just and those that are not.  Those who act on the latter and
not the former merit universal hatred, since they bring to ruin their own country or that
of their neighbor, by the unique motivation to satisfy a vain glory or an unmeasured
ambition.”
28
For Callières, who worked close to the king, the war of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714)
illustrated the very fact that Louis XIV went overboard.  Louis XIV, whose personal vanity led him to
want his grandson Philippe to inherit Spain, engaged France to the interests of his family vanity.  The
memoirs that Callières wrote to the Secretary of State Torcy changed nothing.  Whatever persuasive
arguments were put forward, war prevailed over a negotiated solution. Louis XIV’s desire to win over
his neighbors dominated the rest of his reign.  On his death bed, Louis XIV recognizes his error when
confiding to the future king Louis XV:
“You must avoid to wage war: it is the ruin of the nations. Do not follow the bad
example that I have given you in that respect; I have often undertaken war too lightly
and have supported it by vanity. Do not imitate me, but be a peaceful prince. ”
29
Do what I say, not what I do.  Definitely, Louis XIV’s politics is in flagrant contradiction with
the following principles that Callières stresses in his introductory chapter to Negotiating with Princes:
“Every Christian prince must have as a principal maxim to not use the means of arms
to support rights until after all the means of reason and persuasion have been tried.”
30
                                                                
28 Idem, pp. 136-137.
29 Dangeau  (1854).
30 Callières (2002), p. 63.Callières: A Rhetorical Foundation of International Negotiations
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Louis XIV applied the reverse, going to war first and negotiating for peace later, subordinating
reason and morality to passions, while “one wishes that a prince or a minister does not stray from
moral principles and rather puts them into practice and accords them always to his political maxims.”
31
In this sense, the publication of his work with a dedication to Louis XIV would not only have
been unwelcome for personal reasons.  It would have meant for Callières an ultimate denial of his own
political rationality where war is the last recourse, “l’ultima ratio regis” (the king’s last argument),  to
recall the formula written on the royal canons.
From Alternative Politics to Peace Equilibrium
Louis XIV and his permanent use of force, legitimized by absolute power, belonged to the 17
th
Century. His successor, the regent Philippe Orléans, will start anew, with an alternative politics.
Callières could provide a foundation for this new way of ruling.
The Art of Handling Hearts or the Foundation of Societies
Deliberate or not, Callière’s work is finally published when the royal powers shifted to the
hands of Philippe of Orleans.  The latter, to whom Callières’s work is finally dedicated, incarnates a
different political hope, and the regent’s personality will lead him to “a new practice of government,
more liberal in appearance, looking for consultation and appeasement”.
32  The author pushes for an
alternative, more legitimate politics and political philosophy that break with the idea of leaving full
reign to a the Sun King, the “lieutenant of god on earth”.
To secure this alternative legitimacy, here is an original conception of the foundation of
societies, which is provided by the Science of the world:
“ -  You believe that persuasion was more important than force in establishing the first
sovereigns?
- Without any doubt, in order to be convinced, you only need to consider that first men
were born equal and that the power of some who raised above the others began by
esteem and affection from a certain number of men, who judged them capable of
leading and commanding, and put themselves in a position to obey them.”
33
Callières proposed a foundation of society that is not based on God, force or a social contract:
“It is the great art of handling hearts (manier les cœurs) and winning the inclinations
of man which must be seen as the great work of the human mind, and that which
                                                                
31 De la Science du monde, pp. 223-4.
32 Bély (1996), p. 467.
33 De la Science du monde, p. 10.Callières: A Rhetorical Foundation of International Negotiations
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formed the first societies between men, which gave them laws and which established
various degrees of power between them that was passed on to their descendants.”
34
So, human persuasion holds the high road, even for royal power, because “power that is established on
fear is neither sure or lasting.”
35  A benevolent rhetoric founded internal as well as international order.
Without going as far as visionary William Penn’s Essay on the present and future peace in Europe
(1693) or Abbot Saint-Pierre’s Project to bring perpetual peace in Europe (1713),
36 Callières, in a
more technical register, proposes a realistic conception in which peace is looked for, and maintained
through, a network of national negotiators who engage in a dialogue with foreign princes based on
friendship and confidence, on the European scene.
Negotiators’ Power Stronger than Laws
Callières builds his peace politics on the combined rationality of rulers and negotiators, and
makes very strong statements where “the art of negotiating has more power than all the laws [human
beings] have invented.”
37 This quote, which is coherent with his conception of ruling as a capacity of
handling hearts, is properly revolutionary.  Callières does not simply state that a negotiator’s
persuasion should be tried first and can therefore be more influential than  force; it can be even
stronger than laws themselves. Callières is breaking with both legal positivism and the power of the
sovereign to edict what the laws are, or with natural law, that would anchor laws in a supreme source,
most often god’s commandments themselves. For his, laws are conventions that come from human
creation. The rule of law becomes secondary with respect to the rule of negotiators, as the latter
permanently impact and shape the conventions, i.e. the changing laws, by their persuasive power.
In Callières’s reasoning, laws and rights are often in contradiction with each other and contain
so many questionable answers or gaps, that disputes – be it the breach of peace either in private or
international contexts – are unavoidable and can only be resolved at their best not so much by a priori
given norms, but by a conversation with princes through negotiators, who use their capacity to master
their art, to refer to possible norms and to successfully influence the convention that hopefully follows.
If Callières is conventionalist or contractualist; he is one in his own right. Far from inventing any type
of horrible or ideal “state of nature” with a fictive ensuing social compact, as Hobbes or Locke would,
he looks in front of his eyes and is inspired by the practical reality of bellicose or peaceful outcome.
He concludes that controversies, involving conflicting rights and power, lead either to the prevalence
of force – war politics – or to multiple discussions, exchange of arguments, in order to strike the
balance in another direction, in search for common ground with all final decision makers, in a process
that hopefully leads to a convention that everyone applies afterwards – this looks more like peace
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politics. If Callières is a partisan of contracts, he sees them at their best as negotiators’ byproducts of
handling hearts.
In the latter conception, if we push it further, there is no more any hiatus between political
philosophy and law, between the fiction of an immutable social compact in public law, on one side,
and the negotiated dynamic reality of legislative debates and of contracts of private law, on the other
side. Negotiation, as part of the tradition of rhetoric, occupies a central stage in the philosophical
foundation of both public and private laws, and even in the sphere of international law, that often
everyone has a hard time conceiving as law, precisely because there is no third-party, an authority like
a judge or a legislator to say who is right or wrong and to enforce a decision. Callières’s conception
comprehensively defines the interactions among states (supranational law), between rulers and citizens
(public law) and between citizens (private law), as originating in negotiation.
Building Peace within and among Nations
Callières understands this contrast between a war politics and a peace politics and this is why
his work also demands a deepening of the art of negotiation, and provides tools to ensure peace
politics with substance. It rests upon a “spirit of diplomacy”,
38 as part of a new form of profane
“European sociability,”
39 which would be different from the constant state of war. Callières praises a
peaceful European equilibrium:
“All the states of Europe have interactions and business to do between them so that we
can see them as members of the same republic.”
40
In a way, this external equilibrium is the same at the international level as the one called for
internally in the social contract, or in a more pragmatic way, as the need for a respect of internal order.
In this way, Callières is closer to Saint-Pierre theory of “perpetual peace” than to Grotius theory of
“just war”. As well as Hobbes, on the basis of his experience of religious civil wars in England in the
first half of the 17
th Century, describes a state of internal war in his Leviathan, where each man with
his passions can disturb his neighbor (what Plaute
41 summarizes as “Homo homini lupus”), Callières,
who has lived all the second half of the 17
th Century as a series of external wars, suggests a “ Natio
nationi lupus”, where one state, one sovereign can disturb the peace of any neighboring state and
spread the war all over the continent in a dangerous game of dominos. On such a scene, the negotiator
has a noble mission to prevent this terrible story to ever happen. Each prince must be aware of the
importance of the mandate he gives his negotiator; this mandate must translate somehow the moral
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superiority of peace over war. Thus, as internal peace and order are insured by national sovereignty
that is embodied in the king or the assembly, in a philosophy of social compact that protects the life of
citizens, similarly, the European republic of multiple sovereign states is represented by sovereigns and
their negotiators, who should succeed in keeping a peaceful equilibrium among nations.
Most of the political philosophy at Callières’ time is focussing on “internal rest” (repos du
dedans) with its adequate public institutions to put in place. Complementarily, Callières shows that
this search is somehow insufficient and its answers unstable, because internal security of a nation is
conditioned by “the good measures that one takes outside of the country”,
42 which a lot of “national”
political theories of his epoch and of ours miss. His approach is clearly supranational in that sense that,
whatever great form of government we may have inside, it will not fulfill people’s aspirations if states
cannot live in peace with their neighbors. Because of states’ interdependence of interests,
43 one single
prince can upset the equilibrium and make inoperative the best form of government of any neighbor.
Internal order, however perfect it is, runs the risk of being upset at any moment by the chaos of
international disorder. This is therefore the latter that needs to be overcome. And force with reason of
state will be of no use in that respect; conquerors with their powerful armies and their ephemeral
hegemonies will never be able to impose their pax or their universal monarchy to the world. Only
persuasion, according to Callières, may succeed, with the help of talented negotiators.
A Need for a Network of Skillful Negotiators
Adhering, in substance, to a principle of peaceful equilibrium,  Callières appeals to
international pluralism rather than to an illusionary hegemony, with its burdensome sequence of wars.
In this way he believes that France and her negotiators could play a remarkable role in that context, as
they may search for a European equilibrium, as they did notably at the Munster and  Osnabruck
conferences, whose Treaties of 1648 remain a model of balance.
At this moment of “crisis of European consciousness”
44, Callières’s public, weary from wars,
is receptive to alternative political modes.  As Bély brightly puts it: “The moment was crucial, as at the
beginning of this century, an ideological process started, which would lead to a  sacralization of
peace”.
45 According to Callières, the “honest” man “wishes to see that the troubles, disputes and wars
which divide nations stop and that nations are united by a spirit of peace and charity.”
46
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Negotiators are not simply less expensive than entire armies at war, and each one is not simply
worth more than a regiment. If their mission succeeds, it will not produce the resentment that often
follows war and leads to another one. Ambassadors do not simply finish wars, but try to prevent them,
impeding the birth of offensive alliances in favor of defensive ones, and more generally working
towards an atmosphere of reciprocal good will between nations. Especially when negotiators are
permanently established in a country, i.e. independently of any war, as a signal of continuing
friendship and transnational cooperation, they will always be busy, with two major functions: to know
the other prince’s business and to further one’s own prince’s interests, i.e. to be an “honorable spy” in
a constant search for information, and in perpetual communication with one’s host for the purpose of
common prosperity. Ambassadors also contribute to the friendship among rulers, to commerce and
exchanges in Europe.  In a word, effective diplomats assure a great politics to a country, without
overwhelming it with unpredictable commitments, chaos and exhaustion, as wars do.
In order to put this theory in practice, as much as Louis  XIV’s political theory required military
geniuses versed in war science, a ruler or prince needs diplomatic geniuses, versed in the art of
negotiation. Training in one field or the other is indispensable.  Callières alludes to the risk of
amateurism in diplomacy and contrasts the frequent lack of functional rationality in negotiation with
the professionalism required in the army.
47 Even today, one would be more worried if a civilian led
military maneuvers without proper training, than with a diplomat without training and without any
talent for the job. Callières consider that we must “offer to the best ones the conduct of armies, of state
government, and of foreign negotiations, as the mistakes one often makes in these fields are often
without repair.”
48  Indeed, when a mistake is made inside a country, in general, it will not drive foreign
leaders into adverse action, and one’s own rulers can still correct such a mistake themselves, without
any outside interference. On the contrary, when mistakes take place abroad, the consequences can be
enormous, they can affect the decision of foreign powers, and it may not always be in the scope of
one’s own rulers only to be able to amend them. It is a compelling reason to grant the external
negotiation power to the most talented envoys. Continual negotiations à la Richelieu have to be led by
persuasive ministers and ambassadors. This capacity to conduct negotiations skillfully is stressed by
Callières as:
“One may say that the art of negotiating, well or badly implemented, gives its form, good
or bad, to the general state of affairs, and to many particular ones.”
49
If Callières requires skills to be as high for the military and the diplomatic professions, he also
shows the limits of any comparison between the art of war and the art of negotiating, or the reduction
                                                                
47 Callières (2002), p. 63.
48 De la Science du monde, p. 135.
49 Callières (2002), p. 73.Callières: A Rhetorical Foundation of International Negotiations
Alain Pekar Lempereur, ESSEC IRÉNÉ & Research Center, 2003 16
of the latter to the former, as too many people of his time and of ours wrongly believe negotiation to
be the art of confrontation, dissimulation, and manipulation, and to be the simple “pursuit of military
politics by other means” to parody Clausewitz. In negotiation, where parties try to build a mutually
agreeable outcome, that would satisfy both sides’ interests, a good relationship matters, as well as a
spirit of cooperation and efficient communication to lead the way. A military strategy considers the
other as an enemy to wipe out. A negotiation strategy aims at building stable partnerships, with a
search for joint gains. If of course, negotiation cannot avoid tensions, on distributive aspects for
example or other aspects of interactions,
50 even when these tensions appear, there are high incentives
to perpetuate a problem-solving approach that may remain mostly beneficial to both parties.
The Ideal Negotiator, Using Right Techniques for Legitimate Ends
Not everyone is a natural negotiator. Diplomacy breaks with the war logic and makes it
useless.  It prefers a logic of ongoing connivance, in which it is not the other a priori who is the
problem and it is I who responds, but it is the other who raises questions. My and their responses will
help us find the solution.  Humility is the negotiator’s friend and constitutes a condition to become a
good one.  Negotiators must keep themselves in the background to allow the others to move forward
towards them without fear, and they must reappear in due time in subdued light.  They must know
themselves well and take the time to know others, their potential partners, and engage in a benevolent
relationship with them, understanding their limitations, aspirations and passions, while trying by all
means to reconcile their interests with their own.  This is not manipulation or a dissimulation about the
matter at hand, it is the subtle art of entrée en grâces, of entering in the other party’s graces.  This is
the cat that slides ever so softly underneath the blanket, taking advantage of a favorable conjecture.
Negotiation as an instrument can either serve, or hinder government actions, as well as
individuals’ actions. Callières amply evokes the techniques that will help the negotiator achieve ends,
but he goes further in his analysis, moving from procedural to substantive rationality. Convincing
others, implementing one’s mandate through dialogue may be a necessary, but hardly sufficient
condition in order to define a “good” negotiation outcome. Indeed it is not simply a know-how
(savoir-faire) in terms of process that is needed for negotiation to be deemed successful, as in the old
politics of war hegemony; it is also an underlying savoir-être of a honest person. Applied to the realm
of international relations, it means a focus of diplomats on how to be a government representative
serving legitimate ends in negotiations, like when they are rooted in a sincere prince’s wish to promote
a peace politics. The fact that negotiation is a tekhn, a technique,  requires of course a mastery of
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means, but like the art of eloquence, beyond sophistic, it also requires justifiable ends, which was
often not the case for most of Louis XIV’s diplomats.
In a negotiator, this ad hoc combination of means and ends recalls the difference in ancient
rhetoric between an  orator – a former name used for an ambassador with a personal reputation of
being a bonus vir, a honest person – , and a rhetor, who uses the exact same skills, but who is ready to
mobilize them for whatever ends, including wrongful ones. This instrumental neutrality of negotiation
skills must be kept under control, and it can be in two ways: by the ends that the prince sets, and by the
limits on the means that the prince’s negotiators are allowed to use in implementation of their
mandate. It requires a real ethos  of an enlightened negotiator and prince, i.e. a praisable character of
a person who resorts to rightful techniques for ethical objectives, and who is able to refuse to receive
or give a mandate that would be illegitimate. And in any occasion, the slippery slope can happen in
terms of means or ends. As an illustration of this point, Callières narrates the anecdote of Marshall de
Fabert
51 who was asked by cardinal  Mazarin to make statements that amount to false promises and
who gracefully declined the mission, asking the cardinal to keep him for other missions where he
should rather guarantee the faithfulness to promises. Voltaire recalls the story:
“Maybe a minister must have at his service good people and crooks. I can only be
among the first ones.”
52
Lying and deception are other samples of wrongdoing that will not be acceptable, whatever ends they
pretend to serve. If the art of negotiating falls in bad hands, it allows all the excesses, may “cause
sudden revolutions in big states, arm princes and nations against their own interests; excite sedition,
hatred or jealousy; form leagues and other treaties of diverse nature among princes and states with
opposite interests; destroy and break the closest unions.” 
53
Away from Machiavelli’s Prince, right means and right ends must go hand in hand. Callières
insists that too often, it is by lack of proficiency that negotiators condescend to either wrong ends or
means, to the  raison d’état, i.e. the restriction of substantive rationality to the single fact that
government ordered or backed a decision, without any other available justification. Such negotiators
have not been creative enough, and spent enough time with their principal to figure out how the
legitimate interests of their country could be served by other expedients.
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The European Negotiator, Adaptable as Proteus
One can only become a cat by an active process of metamorphosis.  Certain persons are
naturally more talented than others, but “this does not preclude that education may have as much
power on men as their natural inclinations.”
54  Callières’s principal preoccupation was perfecting the
negotiator.  All legitimate means to acquire knowledge should be used to attain this objective.
Apprentice negotiators must read much on the interests of the ruler and on their passions, on customs
and laws that prevail in various countries, on the diverse forms of government and the centers of
power, on the way power is exercised by ministers and on the factions that divide or bring them
together. They must read the great diplomats of the past.  They must also understand that all countries
are interdependent and how Europe resembles a changing partition, according to the liking of its
rulers. If negotiators are called upon by princes, the latter are not less human than they.  There are
many differences between the rulers of the world that one must know, like this habit of being praised
by others.  But well beyond particular facts, it is important to first “know men as they are in
general.”
55 In order to refine their knowledge, young diplomats must work, accompanied by seasoned
colleagues, understand the terrain, and, finally, exercise the functions of an ambassador’s secretary in
order to refine their ear and pen and construct their diplomatic career patiently.
Callières insists on the important role of passions and interests in human behavior.  Thanks to
history, one “understands imagination’s capacity when fueled by passions and what moves are theirs
when the other ignites it.  We also recognize reason’s capacities and limits, strengths and
weaknesses.”
56  Moreover, it appears that “most men act more out of passion than by reason”
57 and
that they “behave more ordinarily by reasons of interests than by rules of justice, so however just may
be a resolution, it suffices that someone believes to have an interest to prevent it, for that one to
oppose it.”
58
The negotiator must not expect to encounter beings of reason, but beings moved by passions
and interests.  This presumption of limited rationality in others obliges us to be prudent, if not silent at
first.  Negotiators must anticipate a possible asymmetry between themselves and the others, recognize
it, without being upset about it and while using in a pedagogical action.  Reason must be exercised
with discretion.  It is about “depriving oneself of one’s own passions in order to accommodate those of
others.”
59  This meeting, seemingly non-engaging, with the human genre supposes from the part of the
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negotiator a firm will to put oneself at the disposition of the other, in harmony.  That is to say to make
oneself empty in order to take in the music of the other.  This first step requires a self-discipline that
helps create or deepen the relationship with others, which is an enormous asset for eventually getting
to the content of the matter.
“It is necessary to first understand the terrain, to examine the passions of those with
whom one has audience, in order to bring to them the issues that they like and know
best.”
60
Callières anthropology of negotiation is asymmetrical since professional diplomats learn to
keep passions to themselves, but without preventing others from expressing them.  The negotiator
must hold fast to this, whatever the circumstances, in order to put all the chances on one’s side, and
become this:
“ agreeable mind which is the master of its passions and movements and which knows
how to adapt its behavior to the different characters and passions of men with whom
in interacts, which accommodates itself to their passions, even their weaknesses, in the
goal to get them to just and reasonable sentiments, especially when important
resolutions are concerned.”
61
In this sense,  Callières is already a philosopher of enlightenment.  He believes in the
improvement of human beings and in the educational value the model negotiator has on fellow
humans.  In adopting an irreproachable behavior, this negotiator transforms the other, and disposes of
a double savoir-faire: taking into account the other’s interest, on the one hand, and the art of the
conversation, on the other hand. Such a behavior also includes an acute capacity to adapt to others as
the old Proteus, one of Posseidon’s vassals, who according to the needs  “will take all the forms, will
change himself in whatever crawls on the earth, in water, in divine fire.”
62
*
*        *
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